Trans-urban Networks of Learning, Mega Events and Policy Tourism: The Case of Manchester's Commonwealth and Olympic Games Projects by Cook, Ian & Ward, Kevin
1 
 
 
 
 
Trans-urban networks of learning, mega-events and policy 
tourism: The case of Manchester’s Commonwealth and Olympic 
Games projects 
 
 
Ian R. Cooka and Kevin Wardb 
a Department of Social Sciences, Northumbria University 
ian.cook@northumbria.ac.uk 
b Geography, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester 
kevin.ward@manchester.ac.uk  
 
 
Published in 2011 in Urban Studies 48 (12), 2519-2535 
Final pre-publication version 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
Using Manchester’s Olympic and Commonwealth Games bids, this paper examines how and 
why city officials learn – acquire knowledge that is used to make change – from other places 
about mega-events and events-led regeneration.  It reveals how Manchester’s public and private 
sector elites visited various cities to compare and to learn as part of their bid assembling 
activities.  It also highlights how other cities’ representatives have visited Manchester to learn 
from its hosting of the 2002 Commonwealth Games bid.  The paper seeks to build conceptually 
on existing work on the New Urban Politics (NUP), entrepreneurial urbanism and mega-events 
by addressing the links between cities competing with, and learning from, elsewhere.  Drawing 
on the growing work on making urban policies mobile, it reveals the trans-urban underpinnings 
of entrepreneurial urbanism, making a case for taking seriously the circuits, networks and webs 
in and through which urban knowledge and learning is constituted and moved around.   
 
- - - 
 
 “[W]hile general lessons can be learnt from the experience of their predecessors, the 
[Olympic Games] organizers inevitably face a steep learning curve by virtue of having to 
assemble from scratch the teams required to bring the Games to fruition and to establish 
their specific working practices.  Logistical difficulties will emerge, mistakes will be made, 
and deadlines will be tested.”  (Gold and Gold, 2008, p. 303) 
 
“Many of the innovations and investments designed to make particular cities more 
attractive as cultural and consumer centres have quickly been imitated elsewhere, thus 
rendering any competitive advantage with a system of cities ephemeral”  (Harvey, 1989, 
p. 12) 
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“So, ‘local’ policy development now occurs in a self-consciously comparative and 
asymmetrically relativized context.  The boundaries of local jurisdictions and policy 
regimes would seem, therefore, to be rather more porous than before” (Peck, 2003, p. 
229) 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Seeking to embody the new go-getting and entrepreneurial spirit that was permeating the public 
and private corridors of power in the city, Manchester City Council in 1990 unveiled a new 
slogan: ‘making things happen’.  As well as highlighting the new attitude of the city, such 
wordplay also sought to shake off the Council’s association with municipal socialism and its 
image of bureaucratic, parochial local government with little business acumen (Cochrane et al., 
1996).  From the late 1980s onwards, attempts to revive a city experiencing deindustrialisation, 
unemployment and poverty would be spearheaded by aggressive place marketing and the 
regeneration of its city centre and selected run-down neighbourhoods (Ward, 2000a; Peck and 
Ward, 2002; Williams, 2003).  Its governance would also subsequently be reconfigured with 
emphasis placed on ‘joined-up working’ between public and private agencies and the 
introduction of a bewildering array of public-private partnerships (Peck and Tickell, 1996; 
Quilley, 1999; Ward, 2000b).   
 Perhaps its most hyped entrepreneurial, partnership-based projects were the 
(unsuccessful) bids for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 Olympic Games and the (successful) bid for the 
2002 Commonwealth Games.  For Bob Scott, the chairman of the Olympic and Commonwealth 
Games bidding committees, the bids sought to unleash the “miraculous regenerative powers” of 
the Games to Manchester (quoted in Isaac, 1992, p. 12).  Hosting the Olympics or 
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Commonwealth Games, so the story went, would help firmly (re)connect Manchester into the 
global economy by providing an unprecedented global platform on which to promote a positive 
image of itself as well as to encourage gentrifiers, investors, and tourists from elsewhere to the 
city (Carlsen and Taylor, 2003; Cambridge Policy Consultants, 2003).   
 The Olympic and Commonwealth Games projects were central elements of the 
transition to the New Urban Politics (NUP) associated with the economic development of 
Manchester, simultaneously altered by and altering the way things were done in the city 
(Cochrane et al., 1996; Quilley, 1999).  A related but far less understood aspect of Manchester’s 
NUP was its position in trans-urban networks of learning and the ways in which such networks 
of learning informed the Games projects and the governance and regeneration of Manchester 
more widely.  As this paper will detail, Manchester’s Olympic and Commonwealth Games 
projects were, and continue to be, deeply embedded in these trans-urban networks of learning.  
On the one hand, Manchester officials would seek inspiration from, visiting in the process, a 
number of other Commonwealth and Olympic cities from Los Angeles to Lillehammer as part 
of the Olympic and Commonwealth Games projects.  On the other hand, Manchester’s hosting 
of the 2002 Commonwealth Games and the associated regeneration of East Manchester would 
also serve as a point of reference for other cities seeking to host major sporting events and 
regenerate inner city areas. 
 The aim of this paper, therefore, is to provide a partial insight into how and why city 
officials learn – acquire knowledge that is used to make change (Campbell, 2008; McFarlane, 
2009) – about mega-events and events-led regeneration from other places and what role and 
importance visiting these places has in the learning process.  To do this, it will consider how and 
why Manchester’s Olympic and Commonwealth officials learnt from other Olympic and 
Commonwealth cities, and how and why officials from elsewhere have visited Manchester to 
learn from the experience of hosting the Commonwealth Games.  The paper is in three sections.  
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The first synthesises existing work on the relationship between economic development, bidding 
and hosting mega-events, and the mobilisation of urban policies.  The second discusses the 
assembling of Manchester’s Olympic and Commonwealth Games bids and the way those in the 
city learnt from the experience of other cities.  The third turns to Manchester as a city that other 
cities’ officials have visited and from which they have learnt.  Taken together, the paper offers a 
glimpse of the trans-urban micro-politics of entrepreneurial urbanism and, to paraphrase 
Manchester’s old slogan, how things are made to happen1.   
 
 
2.  Assembling the Games: Mega-events, entrepreneurial urbanism and learning from 
elsewhere  
 
The Summer and the Winter Olympics and the Commonwealth Games, as Chalkley and Essex 
(1999, p. 369) have noted, are “much more than... sporting competition[s]”.  Since the modern 
day revival of the Olympics in Athens in 1896 and the start of the Commonwealth Games in 
Hamilton (Canada) in 1930, they have made an increasingly large imprint on the political, 
economic and social fabric of the host city as well as those cities who failed in their bids to host 
the events.  Focusing on the Olympics, studies have shown that from the 1950s onwards and 
particularly so after the Barcelona 1992 Olympics, organisers have used the Games to realise 
what Gold and Gold (2008, p. 302) have called, “wider ambitions” for the city, viewing it as a 
                                                
1 This paper draws upon a wider research project examining the use and ramifications of economic development 
study tours in and out of Manchester.  On this theme 20 interviews were conducted with three groups of public and 
private officials who (a) worked in Manchester and visited elsewhere on a study tour, (b) visited Manchester as part 
of a study tour, or (c) helped arrange or host a study tour in Manchester.  These are complemented by documentary 
analysis of ‘fact-finding’ reports and minutes and various newspaper, magazine and online reports of the visits.  A 
triangulation of these methods provides a rich insight into the rationale behind the visits, the activities that took 
place on them, the ‘lessons learnt’ and their wider political-economic context.   
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catalyst for urban development and transformation (see, for instance, Chalkley and Essex, 1999, 
2004; Gold and Gold, 2007a, 2008).  A “politics of fantastic expectations” (Eisienger, 2000, p. 
326) surrounds the Games whereby elites ‘common-sensically’ state that hosting the Games will 
bring private and public investment, tourism, jobs and opportunities for place promotion to the 
city.  Using the example of Berlin’s failed attempt to host the 2000 Olympics, Alberts (2009, p. 
508) argues that the Olympics also provides a positive legacy for failed bid cities, giving them “an 
opportunity to carry out or speed up urban development projects that might otherwise not be 
realized or only much later.”  The Games are presented as parachuted panaceas for a variety of 
urban ills, and legitimised as being ‘good for all’ (Black, 2008; cf. Logan and Moloth, 1987).  
However, these claims have been heavily challenged by some scholars and social movements 
who point to the large public cost and its often regressive impact on the quality-of-life for 
disadvantaged communities in the city.  In seeking to provide a welcoming ‘festival’ atmosphere 
and an investable Games city, urban elites have reprioritised their social agendas.  Gentrifying 
unattractive neighbourhoods, evicting and displacing low income residents and businesses, and 
punitively policing the homeless, protestors and other ‘unnerving’ populations have become 
increasing used repertories for ‘delivering’ (Greene, 2003; Ward, 2003; Lenskyj, 2008; 
Chamberlain, 2009).   
The Olympic and Commonwealth Games can be seen as part of a wider set of 
ambulatory ‘mega-events’ – or ‘hallmark events’ as they are also known – alongside sporting 
World Cups (e.g. football, cricket, rugby), Expo and World Fairs, the European Capital of 
Culture among others (Gold and Gold, 2005).  They can also been viewed as one instrument of 
many through which the New Urban Politics (Cox and Mair, 1988) of entrepreneurial urbanism 
is being played out (Owens, 2000; Ward, 2003).  With the hosting of the Games being 
ambulatory in design and the bidding for the Games often being highly competitive, they are 
symptomatic of – if not a much more frenzied variant of – the intensification of inter-urban 
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competition whereby cities aggressively compete with one another to actively inward investment.  
To use Harvey’s (1989) phrasing, they embody a politics of place which prioritises the flirtatious 
appeasement of privileged elites elsewhere over the needs of local populations.  They are 
entrepreneurial in the sense that they are pump-priming economic-development orientated 
strategies but also because they are highly speculative (Jessop and Sum, 2000); they take what 
Gold and Gold (2007b, p. 6) call “a seldom-admitted gamble” with no guarantees that they will 
bring the cited economic and social benefits to the city.  The Games are also reflective of the 
new power structures of urban governance whereby the private sector has become increasingly 
involved in bidding and organising the Games, alongside occupying a more prevalent position in 
governing cities and distributing services more widely.  The private sector are enticed by the 
potential for future profiteering with their presence legitimised by arguments that they will bring 
increased private sector commitment and funding as well as their efficiency, creativity and 
understanding of the market (Cochrane et al., 1996; Surborg et al., 2008).   
 The apparently ‘mundane’ material and discursive practices of doing Games bidding and 
delivery has been commented upon (see, for instance, S. Ward, 2007; Swart and Bob, 2004).  The 
issues of ‘good practice’ and the circulation of ‘expertise’ within Games governance, however, 
have received only passing attention.  Monclús (2003), for instance, reflects on ‘the Barcelona 
model’ which many associate with its hosting of the 1992 Olympics.  He argues that although the 
model has been widely cited as a singular entity, its constitutive elements are rarely fixed as it 
circulates, being moved from one city to another.  Surborg et al. (2008), meanwhile, briefly 
highlights how as part of the bidding and preparation for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics, 
the Vancouver Board of Trade brought in former Olympic (public and private) organisers from 
other (mainly Anglophone) places to advise and make presentations in the city.  These studies 
aside, the issues of comparison, expertise, learning, and policy movement have yet to receive the 
attention they deserve within this literature.   
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 One body of work that has begun to address these concerns is that emerging on the 
mobility of urban policies.  Drawing on, but advancing considerably, work in political science on 
policy transfer (see, for instance, Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Stone, 2004), it considers how and 
why policies and practices situated in particular towns and cities are ‘mobilised’ and re-embedded 
into new political-economic contexts (e.g. McCann, 2004, 2008, forthcoming a; McCann and 
Ward, 2009, 2010; Cook, 2008; K. Ward, 2006, 2007; S. Ward, 2006, 2009; McFarlane, 2009).  It 
shows that those involved in the making of ‘local’ policy often do so in a self-consciously 
comparative and relational manner, and that learning from elsewhere is not entirely without 
historical precedents (Nasr and Volait, 2003; Rogers, 2009).  McCann (2004) demonstrates how 
best practice guides and league tables are frequently used in order to select places worthy of 
attention and emulation, while Cook (2008) and K. Ward (2006) note how city officials are often 
drawn to places that are held up as regeneration ‘success stories’ in the media.  Furthermore, 
these studies show that the processes through which policies are transferred are never simply 
‘copy and paste’ operations, often involve a myriad of people and institutions, and rarely have 
the same outcomes in their emulator’s locality (Peck and Theodore, 2001; Stone, 2004; McCann, 
forthcoming a).   
 As noted in McCann and Ward (2009, forthcoming), a useful way of conceptualising 
urban policy mobilities is through the productive tension between territoriality and relationality 
which involves the dialectical “study of how urban actors manage and struggle over the ‘local’ 
impacts of ‘global’ flows and also the analysis of how they engage in global circuits of policy 
knowledge.”  It views policies as being simultaneously fixed, or embedded in place, and in 
motion.  One aspect of this making mobile of policies that has yet to be fully theorized is the 
role of policy tourism, whereby officials from particular places visit other places to look, learn 
and listen (McCann, forthcoming a).  Although ‘fact-finding trips’ or ‘study tours’ as they are 
commonly known are a common feature of contemporary urban governance (Ward, 2010), 
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relatively little is known about their performance, role in urban governance or their ramifications.  
To consider these issues further we turn to an analysis of the Commonwealth and Olympic 
Games-themed ‘learning and lobbying’ visits undertaken in and out of Manchester since the mid-
1980s.   
 
 
3.  Manchester learns from other cities 
 
In February 1985 a story circulated around the British media that the then-Conservative Prime 
Minister, Margaret Thatcher together with her Sports Minister, Neil MacFarlane, were impressed 
by the profit making, privately run and financed Los Angeles 1984 Summer Olympic Games.  So 
much so that they privately thought that the UK, or more precisely London, should consider 
bidding for the forthcoming Olympics (see, for instance, Evans, 1985).  On hearing this news in 
Manchester, Bob Scott, a well-connected theatre manager, decided that the Olympics must be 
hosted outside of the capital city – in his view, Manchester.  In a matter of days he assembled a 
private sector-dominated bid committee that would attempt to win the rights to host the 1992 
Summer Olympics in Manchester.  The City Council would not commit public money but did 
support the bid.  Scott, like Thatcher, was impressed by the profit-making and, most importantly, 
the private sector running and financing of the LA Olympics bidding and planning, something 
that he would attempt to emulate – in part because Thatcher made it clear that any UK Games 
bid should be private sector-led and financed.  The decidedly neoliberal LA Olympics marked a 
radical departure from the Communist era Moscow 1980 Olympics and the state-funded, debt-
ridden Montreal 1974 Olympics, and in the minds of those in Manchester, London and 
elsewhere it demonstrated that the Games could run at a profit with little imprint on the 
taxpayer’s pockets (see Gold and Gold, 2007).   
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 The LA Olympics would become an important point of reference for Manchester’s 1992 
bid and would continue to resonate in the subsequent bids.  Not least because Scott clearly 
admired Peter Ueberroth, the former travel entrepreneur and chief organiser of the post-bid 
preparations for the LA Olympics.  So much so that he, perhaps with a touch of irony, later 
stated in an interview, “I’ve read his book and I dream of being Peter Ueberroth” (quoted in 
Isaac, 1992, p. 12).  As well as reading Ueberroth’s (1985) autobiography, Made in America, Scott 
would seek out the methods of the LA Olympics from two key sources.  First, Scott hired the 
Manchester branch of Arthur Young, led by Rick Parry, to act as management consultants for 
the 1992 and 1996 bids, a role the LA branch of Arthur Young did for the LA Olympics 
(Reeves, 1989).  As part of the contract, Scott and his team would have exclusive access to 
Arthur Young’s LA Olympic files and Arthur Young would prepare a report on how to emulate 
the success of the LA Games (Ellis, 1985).  Second, Scott, Parry and other officials at Arthur 
Young visited Los Angeles on a post-Games ‘fact-finding trip’ to meet senior officials who ran 
the Games and to inspect the venues.  They toured the facilities, spoke to those overseeing the 
project and reflected on how to translate these findings into some concrete proposals for 
Manchester.  In doing so, Manchester sought to reproduce a long-standing tradition for future 
host cities delegations and, more recently, bidding cities delegations to visit Olympic cities 
before, during or after the event.  During the LA Olympics, for instance, delegations from three 
future Olympic hosts and ten Olympic bidding cities were in attendance (Los Angeles Olympic 
Organising Committee, 1984).  As Rick Parry noted, the trip not only provided an insight as to 
what to do but also what not to do: 
 
“In Los Angeles the intention was to make a profit.  When you visit there now it is 
difficult to find any trace of the games.  We can learn from their expertise but our 
aims are different.  We want the games to provide a sporting legacy for Manchester 
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and Britain.  We want to build new facilities which will be used by the people of 
the area.  It will do wonders for the city.”  (Quoted in Palmer, 1985, p. 7) 
 
Manchester’s developing plans for the 1992 Games stressed the long-term legacy that the 
Olympics would have on the city-region.  In particular, it would improve the sporting facilities 
and regenerate the still-floundering city region, particularly the west of Manchester where the 
Olympic Stadium and main Olympic Village (athletes’ accommodation) were planned.  This, as 
Parry noted, juxtaposed with the more ‘in-and-out’ approach of the LA Games (see also 
Andranovich et al., 2001) and as a result, it was LA’s private sector-led board composition rather 
than its legacy aims that would prove the largest influence on Manchester’s Olympic project.   
 Ultimately, Manchester’s 1992 bid failed; it did not get the nod from the British Olympic 
Association (BOA) in 1985 to be the British ‘candidate city’ put forward to the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) vote, where the members of the IOC would anonymously vote for 
the host city.  Birmingham, who won the BOA vote, subsequently finished fifth out of six 
candidate cities behind the winner Barcelona.   
 Manchester would bid again for the 1992 and 1996 Olympics (Cochrane et al., 1996, Law, 
1994).  This time the Council was more involved.  This change in level of participation reflected 
a broader shift in emphasis in UK city politics:  
 
“Most British cities, most local governments in the 1980s, had become very 
introspective…  It was about focusing on internal problems rather than about how we 
solved the real problems of the city… There was a process of having to go out and sell 
Manchester, and to think, ‘what have we got to sell?’  This changed our thinking process” 
(ex-public sector member of the Olympic Game bid committees, interview, December 
2009) 
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The city received the official nomination of the BOA and was short-listed by the IOC.  
However, it lost the final IOC vote in 1990 to Atlanta for the 1996 Olympics.  And in 1993, with 
a bid for the 2000 Olympics which moved the proposed central sporting facilities and Olympic 
Village to redundant industrial land in the east of the city, Manchester would once again lose out 
in the IOC vote, this time to Sydney (for an outline of the BOA and IOC voting see Figure 1).   
  
LA was certainly not the only place visited as part of the three Olympic bids.  The 
promotional documents for the 1996 and 2000 bids fondly talked of the “globetrotting” 
conducted by the private and public sector members of the bidding committee, as well as its ‘bid 
ambassadors’, such as Bobby Charlton, the former Manchester United footballer, and Princess 
Anne, the president of the BOA.  As an ex-public sector member of the Olympic Game bid 
committees remembers: 
 
“I don’t know how many times I went to Barcelona … it must have been six or eight 
times.  I went to Atlanta two or three times because the IOC meet in different places so 
you are not only talking to the... places that won the Games you were talking to but also 
the cities that were trying to get them at the time, such as Melbourne and Toronto.  You 
also learn from what they are doing.”   
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Figure 1: BOA and IOC voting for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 Olympic Games 
 
1992 Olympic Games 
BOA vote, London, 12 July 1985 
Birmingham 25 (votes); Manchester 5; London 2 
IOC vote, Lausanne, 17 October 1986 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3   
Barcelona (w) 29 (votes) 37 47   
Paris 19 20 23   
Brisbane 11 9 10   
Belgrade 13 11 5   
Birmingham 8 8 Eliminated   
Amsterdam 5 Eliminated -   
 
1996 Olympic Games 
BOA vote, London, 19 May 1988 
Manchester 20; Birmingham 11 
IOC vote, Tokyo, 18 September 1990 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
Atlanta (w) 19 20 26 34 51 
Athens 23 23 26 30 35 
Toronto 14 17 18 22 Eliminated 
Melbourne 12 21 16 Eliminated - 
Manchester 11 5 Eliminated - - 
Belgrade 7 Eliminated - - - 
 
2000 Olympic Games 
BOA vote, London, 24 April 1991 
Manchester 28; London 5 
IOC vote, Monte Carlo, 23 September 1993 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4  
Sydney (w) 30 30 37 45  
Beijing 32 37 40 43  
Manchester 11 13 11 Eliminated  
Berlin 9 9 Eliminated -  
Istanbul 7 Eliminated - -  
 
Note: Within the IOC vote, each IOC member has one vote.  A candidate city wins if they have 
an absolute majority of the votes.  If no city has an absolute majority, a new voting round will 
take place with the lowest scoring city from the previous round eliminated.  New rounds will 
continue until a majority winner occurs.   
(w) = winner 
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One newspaper reporter joked in 1989 that “Robert Scott’s diary for next year contains details of 
more flights abroad than the logbook of most airline pilots” (Davenport, 1989, p. 8).  Post-BOA 
vote, the deceptive simple goal of the 1996 and 2000 bids was to convince each member of the 
IOC to vote for Manchester to be the host city.  As all the other bidding cities had realised, 
producing glossy documents and videos was not enough; frequent face-to-face contact was 
deemed essential in order to gain their trust, personalise their promotional message and develop 
pseudo-friendships.  As with every candidate city, IOC members were invited to visit 
Manchester where they would be met by a delegation of local elites, view staged ‘community 
events’ and shown around the city.  During the bidding for the 2000 Olympics, John Major, 
appointed Prime Minister in November 1990, would also hold receptions for IOC members, 
marking a departure from the ‘hands off’ approach by his predecessor Margaret Thatcher during 
Manchester’s 1992 and 1996 bids (Law, 1994).  Learning from past Olympic bidding campaigns 
elsewhere, Manchester officials also visited the IOC members.  Visits to individual IOC 
members were conducted as were visits to events where several IOC members were attending2.  
Their visits included the Summer Olympics in Seoul (1988) and Barcelona (1992), the 
Commonwealth Games in Auckland (1990), the Winter Olympics in Calgary (1988) and 
Albertville (1992) (which were also attended by IOC members), as well as other events such as 
IOC sessions and regional meetings, and the congresses of numerous sporting federation and 
associations (Hill 1992, 1993).   
                                                
2 The issue of IOC members’ visits to candidate cities and visits by bidders to individual IOC members would 
become global news in November 1998 when it was revealed that as part of Salt Lake City’s successful campaign to 
host the 2002 Winter Olympics a small number of IOC members used these visits to ask for, or accept, expensive 
gifts for themselves and their families from bidder in return for their vote (Mallon, 2002).  From December 1999 
IOC members would be banned from both visiting candidate cities and from arranging meetings with candidate city 
representatives outside of sanctioned international sporting events and meetings.  A small ‘Evaluation Commission’ 
would make one trip to each candidate city for four days each and their technical evaluation report would be given 
to IOC members prior to the vote (www.olympic.org).   
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 The primary focus for the majority of the ‘globetrotting’ trips was to lobby rather than to 
learn.  IOC members would be cornered in corridors and taken out for drink and meals, wooed 
with talk of envisioning strategies and legacies.  Mobile face-to-face lobbying has been a long-
standing practice in Olympic bidding, with Manchester officials often jockeying with other 
bidding committees at these event for the attention of IOC members.  To quote the journalist 
Matthew Moore (1988, p. 17), “the press[ing] of prawns and an ample supply of liquor on 
anyone who has a say in who should host the games... [is] part of the lengthy political and social 
process that any city aiming to host the games must master”.  Nonetheless, the visits to Summer 
and Winter Olympics, as interviewees have noted, were to a degree Janus-faced as lobbying 
mixed with learning (although the learning ‘face’ was certainly smaller than the lobbying ‘face’!).  
Although much time was spent in hotel lobbies seeking ‘chance encounters’ with IOC members 
(S. Ward, 2007), Manchester officials attended the Observer Programmes at most of these 
events.  Run by the local Organising Committees, the Observer Programmes offered the chance 
for hosts-in-waiting and bidding committee officials to see close-up the ‘behind-the-scenes’ 
working of the Games and opportunities to liaise with the host officials.  Being there, 
networking, socialising provided opportunities to learn and reflect:  
 
“It’s the things that people don’t put into the reports, on the Internet, those insights into 
what they have done either in getting the Games, winning the bids, or regenerating the 
city, which they will tell you over a glass of lager in a bar at 11 o’clock at night” (ex-
public sector member of the Olympic Game bid committees, interview, December 2009)  
 
 A learning-focused visit in 1988 made by Scott to Lillehammer, a town of 25,000 
inhabitants in Southern Norway, which had just won the bidding for the 1994 Winter Olympics, 
seemed to leave a big impression on Bob Scott.  In Scott’s words, the trip confirmed to him – 
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rather than taught him – the tactics through which to win the IOC vote.  It also confirmed to him 
that the IOC can vote for ‘less-global’ cities (such as Manchester): 
 
“The first thing I did when I got back to Manchester [from the Seoul 1988 Olympics] 
was to call the people from Lillehammer and make an appointment to talk to them.  I 
spent two days there.  I’m the only city that did that.  That’s amazing to me.  They 
confirmed some things for me: Timing is critical.  And if you peak too soon or too late – 
if IOC members visit so early they forget you or so late they have already made up their 
minds – you’re dead.” (Quoted in Johnson, 1990, p. 18) 
 
Summarising an interview with Scott, Christopher Hill (1992, p. 112) also noted the impression 
that the Lillehammer visit had made: 
 
“Scott was much encouraged by a visit [to Lillehammer]... It was two and a half hours 
from the nearest airport; it had fewer inhabitants than there were members of the 
Olympic ‘family’, and on the day before the vote experts has considered it a rank 
outsider.  However, Lillehammer’s lobbying strategy fitted very well with that being 
developed by Manchester: their team had confirmed that it was necessary to have a 
different marketing message for each IOC member and that the main objective must be 
to gain their trust and friendship, and they were convinced that the bidding team must be 
very small to avoid confusing the members.”  
 
Learning from elsewhere, therefore, was not only about the content of the bid, but also its 
presentation.  The Lillehammer-come-Manchester lobbying strategies did not prove effective for 
Manchester and after losing the Olympic bid at the third attempt in Monte Carlo in 1993, it was 
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quickly decided that Manchester would concentrate on bidding for the 2002 Commonwealth 
Games.  It was felt that with consecutively low IOC voting numbers, another Olympic bid 
would be ineffective.  Nonetheless, in the words of Bob Scott, Manchester needed to “continue 
to ‘think big’” (quoted in Rodda, 1993, p. 11).  Although seen as less prestigious, a 
Commonwealth Games bid would utilise the built-up bidding expertise, and rekindle hopes of 
regeneration through the hosting of a mega-event.  Echoing the 2000 Olympic bid, a (reduced-
sized) stadium and indoor arena in East Manchester, an Olympic-sized swimming pool and a 
Games Village in the City Centre were the main construction works planned.  A number of pre-
existing arena and sporting venues across Greater Manchester would be utilised.  The Games 
Village – which would be converted into student accommodation post-Games – was ultimately 
never constructed with existing university accommodation temporarily used as the Games 
Village instead.   
 Instead of the BOA and IOC, Manchester would have to convince the Commonwealth 
Games Council for England (CGCE) and the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) of its 
worth.  Competition was less intense than during the three Olympic bids with much less 
‘globetrotting’ conducting during the bidding stages.  Manchester beat London by 17 votes to 7 
at a meeting with the CGCE in February 1994 to become the English candidate city, but was the 
sole candidate for the CGF vote.  Following an evaluation visit to Manchester by CGF members 
in July 1995, Manchester was awarded the 2002 Games in November 1995.  Despite the lack of 
competitors, trips were conducted to various CFG meetings and events that CFG members 
attended including the Victoria Commonwealth Games (1994) which all CGF members attended 
and where, once again, lobbying took precedent.  These visits were seen as necessary as 
Manchester officials still needed to convince the CFG that it was a worthy host and they were 
aware that new candidate cities could appear at almost any time.   
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 After Manchester was awarded the 2002 Games, Bob Scott stepped down as chair of the 
committee with Robert Hough, the chairman of Manchester Ship Canal, replacing him.  Learning 
from elsewhere would become a key part of the preparations for the Games.  For the organisers, 
this was necessary due to their lack of first-hand experience planning post-bid a major multi-sports 
event and the limited guidance offered by the CFG.  It also stemmed from a belief that it was 
unwise to ‘reinvent the wheel’.  Once again, they sought out (and were regularly offered) the 
services of professionals with experience of working on multi-sports events and a number were 
employed in-house or as consultants.  One interviewee noted that Manchester sought to take 
advantage of the emergent specialist and highly-mobile labour market, or “caravan of 
consultants” as he put it, which “goes around the world... from one sporting event to another” 
(ex-private sector member, Manchester Commonwealth Games Ltd, interview, November 2009).  
In addition they visited more places and people hosting major multi-sports events.  Large 
delegations from Manchester visited the Atlanta Olympic Games (1996), Sydney Olympics 
(2000), Edmonton Youth Championships (2001) and made several trips to Kuala Lumpur before 
and during the 1998 Commonwealth Games.   
 With the voting finished and lobbying no longer required, the composition of the 
delegations changed with newly employed ‘operational’ staff replacing the celebrity ambassadors 
who frequented the visits made by the Olympic bidding team.  At these events, they would focus 
on the specificities of how to implement a well-organised Games focusing on seemingly all 
aspects of Games operations most noticeably transportation, security, accommodation, 
sponsorship, the volunteer schemes, ticketing, merchandise, catering, ceremonies, media, and 
wider city cultural events.  At the Sydney Games, a number of Manchester delegates took the 
role of volunteer workers to gain ‘hands on’ experience of staging the Games (Manchester 
Commonwealth Games Ltd., 2000).   
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 Lengthy and finely detailed reports were written after the trips to Kuala Lumpur and 
Sydney focusing on the positive and the negative aspects, and the “lessons for M2002”.  Unlike 
the generally upbeat Sydney report, the Kuala Lumpur report was extremely critical about 
numerous aspects of its running, notably the lack of training and poor treatment of the 
volunteers, something that should be repeated in Manchester (Manchester Commonwealth 
Games Ltd., 1998).  The “lessons for M2002” in both went from very specific issues such as the 
location of sponsorship advertising inside and outside of the venues to more overarching, more 
abstract lessons.  The Sydney report, for instance, demanded that: “Delivering a technically 
proficient sporting event in itself is not enough, we must create a sense of theatre, of occasion” 
and detailed how this must be achieved, a la Sydney: “We need to dress the City, we need banner 
banners and effective signage, we need to have information about the Games readily available in 
a variety of media, we need live, non-sport events to complement our programme” (Manchester 
Commonwealth Games Ltd., 2000, p. 5).   
 Manchester would also take advantage of the wider moves by the IOC and the CGF to 
develop more formal structures to facilitate ‘knowledge transfer’ between Games as part of wider 
concerns that ‘good practices’ were not always being drawn upon by subsequent Games 
organisers.  Following the Sydney Olympics the IOC paid the Sydney Organising Committee for 
the Olympic Games to write one hundred best practice ‘manuals’ on how to and how not to 
stage the Games, documents which would circulate internationally as well as in the offices of 
Manchester Commonwealth Games Ltd (Lehmann, 2000).  The IOC’s knowledge transfer 
programme has expanded since 2000 and now involved the publication of best practice guides; 
the organising of seminars featuring keynote speakers from previous Games and the IOC; and, 
from Athens 2004 onwards, centrally orchestrated Observer Programmes and Secondment 
Programmes at each Games.  The CGF would also develop a similar knowledge transfer system, 
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its centrepiece being a Commonwealth Games Observer Programme, the first of which took 
place at the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester.   
 
4.  Other cities learn from Manchester 
 
Manchester’s Observer Programme commenced during the week before the Games.   Fourteen 
groups in the process of bidding for, or planning, major sporting events attended the 
Programme (Johnson, 1990).  The participants included officials due to host the Athens 
Olympics (2004), the following Commonwealth Games in Melbourne (2006), and the Abuja All 
African Games (2003).  Also present were officials representing New Delhi, Singapore, and 
Hamilton, Halifax and Montreal in Canada all with a view to bidding for the 2010 
Commonwealth Games, as well as a South African delegation bidding to host the 2010 World 
Cup. The Observer Programme involved visits to all the sporting, media and accommodation 
sites used during the Games.  It also involved two seminar days featuring presentations and 
question and answer sessions with all of the senior organising officials, as well as social functions 
to ‘network’ with the Manchester officials, CFG officials and other participants.  The participants 
were then free to watch the Games the following week.   
 For the local organisers and the CFG, the Observer Programme overcame the logistical 
and organisational problems caused by hosting several important groups, who wanted to see 
broadly similar sights and ask broadly similar questions.  It also offered the hosts a chance to 
showcase their plans and facilities as the Commonwealth Games were about promoting 
Manchester to the world.  What is more, the visitors were not viewed as competitors per se as 
there were no plans for a ‘mega-event’ to be held in Manchester in the foreseeable future.  And, 
of course, the Observer Programme also provided a good networking space for those working 
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on the Manchester team to meet potential future employers working on major sporting events 
elsewhere.   
 For those officials seeking to host the 2010 Commonwealth Games, the Observer 
Programme was seen as a potentially valuable conduit through which to lobby and learn.  One 
member of the Hamilton delegation reasoned that “it really is a starting point to learn and spread 
the word that your city is serious on bidding and hosting the Games” (interview, October 2009).   
Furthermore, he argued that it offered an invaluable opportunity to speak to people who knew 
how to bid for and organise a Commonwealth Games, providing advice on “potential landmines 
and co-ordination issues” and offering “a road map to organise your Games”.  For those visiting 
Manchester who were in the process of planning stages of organising a major sporting event – 
and echoing Manchester’s post-1996 study tours – it was viewed as a good opportunity to learn 
about the more intricate and mundane ways in which a sporting event could be run, how the 
wider regeneration and boosterist city programmes could be rolled out, and how the two could 
be integrated (Melbourne City Council, 2002).  Such specificities, it was argued, could not be 
gleamed from the broad-brush media coverage of the Games (interview, ex-councillor, 
Melbourne City Council, October 2009).   
 While the closing ceremony took place on 4 August 2002, the study visits to the 
Commonwealth Games facilities and to East Manchester more widely did not finish there.  
Numerous planning, architecture, housing and regeneration themed study tours have focused on 
East Manchester.  This comes at a time when Manchester – and East Manchester in particular – 
has become a ‘mecca’ for planning and regeneration study tours fuelled by its internationalising 
reputation for ‘best practice’ regeneration (Peck and Ward, 2002; Williams, 2003).  Such tours 
have been organised by professional organisations in the UK (such as the Royal Town Planning 
Institute and BURA) and abroad for whom study tours have been a long-standing method of 
professional learning.  Individual professionals and organisations from the UK and abroad (such 
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as Hamburg City Council) have also arranged to visit East Manchester to see the regeneration 
schemes first-hand.  The tours have often involved walking tours and presentations by officials 
from the council, university and New East Manchester Company (the Urban Regeneration 
Company) whose well-rehearsed “protocols and packaged procedures... [are] efficient for the 
hosts and also edifying and enjoyable for the guests” (McCann, forthcoming a, p. 22).   The 
focus here is not on the practicalities of bidding for and planning a multi-sports event, but 
regenerating a deprived inner city community.   
 Bidders and planners of major sporting events have continued to visit Manchester post 
2002 to look, listen and learn.  Several officials from Hamilton have revisited Manchester after 
the Games (Kernaghan, 2003, 2009).  The rationale behind these trips stressed the ‘common 
problems, common solutions’ of the two cities whereby both have sought to combat industrial 
decline through Games-led regeneration, a strategy that Hamilton has continued to seek through 
bidding (unsuccessfully) for the 2014 Commonwealth Games and bidding, together with 
Toronto, for the 2015 Pan American Games.  The city was also assisted by developing 
friendships between officials in the two cities (interview, official, City of Hamilton, October 
2009).  A small number of visitors involved in the preparations for the London 2012 Olympics 
have also visited Manchester including a team from the Greater London Assembly seeking to 
learn how small businesses could benefit from the London 2012 Olympics (Greater London 
Assembly, 2006).  In addition, the South African Portfolio Committee on Transport who, with 
legislation to construct municipal transport authorities passed in early 2008 and the 2010 
Football World Cup looming, visited in 2008 to consider how metropolitan transport authorities 
could ease transportation problems during major sporting events (Portfolio Committee on 
Transport, 2008).  And finally, officials from the forthcoming Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth 
Games have visited Manchester in summer 2009 following political and media criticism over 
their varied ‘exotic’ study tours that until that point had not included Manchester.  Scottish 
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Ministers and Games officials visited London, Vancouver (2010 Winter Olympics hosts), the 
Commonwealth Youth Games in Pune, a Rugby Sevens tournament in Dubai, and Barcelona 
where the Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond pronounced that “[t]here’s probably no better 
place on earth to look to for inspiration than Barcelona, where the 1992 Olympics transformed 
the city into the vibrant and successful place it is today” (quoted in Dinwoodie, 2008, p. 3).  A 
point to which Frank McAveerty, a Labour Member of the Scottish Parliament, responded:  
 
“The SNP [Scottish National Party] cabinet seem to be running their own Harlem 
Globetrotters.  But sometimes the nearest place is the most sensible one.  Manchester 
and Glasgow have much in common – and the east end of Manchester is benefiting in 
the way that we would expect the east end of Glasgow to benefit.  There is a lot to learn 
and I am astonished that SNP ministers haven’t chosen to go there, instead of these 
more exotic locations.” (Quoted in Gardham, 2009, p. 9) 
 
This reveals that learning from elsewhere is an inherently political and selective process, 
involving decisions about where to go, who to speak to, and where to cite.  And as Stephen 
Ward (2008) has argued with reference to the models of waterfront redevelopment, the 
popularity of places as best practice models shifts across space and time.  With the ever-growing 
list of subsequent multi-sports events elsewhere (not least the much-hyped and nearby London 
2012 Olympics) and, of course, the expected long shadow of the current recession, it is likely 
that the use of Manchester as a source of Games inspiration will decline.  It remains to be seen, 
however, whether Manchester will continue to be a source of inspiration and study tour 
destination for urban regeneration more widely and, if so, what lessons it will be seen to offer in 
the future.   
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5.  Conclusion  
 
According to Campbell (2008, p. 4) ‘the notion of learning… has been given too little attention 
in urban policy circles.”  We would concur.  In light of this, the paper has argued that 
comparison and learning from other places is a key aspect of the New Urban Politics (Cox and 
Mair, 1988).  City officials have sought to learn from other places in order to compare their own 
performance and to improve their competitiveness.  The foundational work on entrepreneurial 
urbanism by Harvey (1989, p. 10) observed the “repetitive and serial reproduction of certain 
patterns of development”.  His work and that by others at the time, such as Logan and Molotch 
(1987) and Stone (1989), successfully revealed the ways in which territorial alliances of different 
stripes formed to protect exchange values and to maintain the conditions for capital 
accumulation.  What this body of work underplayed was the ways in which urban politics is both 
territorial and relational.  Cities are parts of circuits, networks and webs in and through which 
they compare and learn.  It is through these that the “serial reproduction” about which that 
Harvey (1989, p. 10) writes takes place, as cities as territories are constantly being assembled, 
disassembled and reassembled: fixity and motion a la Harvey (1973).   
In light of these comments, this paper has sought to present a different sort of account 
of contemporary Manchester, a city about which much has been written in recent years.  
Drawing upon McCann (forthcoming b, p. 18), it has sought to demonstrate that in order to 
understand Manchester’s Olympic and Commonwealth Games projects, we must recognise how 
it is “constituted by the very real and very local concerns of [Manchester]... but it is also shaped 
by travels to, stories from, and relations among a range of other places.  The city’s... policy and 
the politics that surround it are studded with these ‘parts of elsewhere’ and are, therefore, both 
territorial and global-relational assemblages”.   
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 Two important points about the making mobile of urban policies can be drawn out of 
this paper.  First, with regard to the methods of learning, it has shown that visiting other places is 
seen as a valuable learning technique.  Being there, so to speak, has not been diminished by the 
growth in mediated information that is available over the internet.  Gaining a ‘first-hand’ sensory 
understanding of how things actually look and work as well as a (potential) opportunity to meet 
the ‘experts’ and ask focused questions is still valued by those in the business of urban policy-
making.  Nonetheless, as the case of Manchester’s Olympic and Commonwealth Games projects 
have also shown, such visits are frequently used in conjunction with other methods of learning such 
as the employment of people with related experience elsewhere, the commissioning of ‘fact-
finding’ reports, the reading of best practice guidance, media reports and broadcasts, and the 
attending of ‘how-to’ conferences and seminars (McFarlane 2009; McCann, 2010; Ward, 2006, 
2007, 2010).    
 Second, this paper also expands upon geographical critiques of political science policy 
transfer studies which “tends to assume that policies are transferred from one place to another 
relatively intact while ignoring the modifications and struggles that occur along the way” 
(McCann, forthcoming b, p. 5; Peck and Theodore, 2001; Cook and Ward, 2010).  In particular, 
it has strived to show that policy transfer does not necessarily involve a single, linear and literal 
policy movement from place A to place B but can involve places using a multitude of points of 
reference elsewhere in terms of what to do and what not to do.  Those involved in the Games 
visits in and out of Manchester were not single-mindedly focusing on what is happening in one 
destination but where thinking about, reading about, visiting, discussing and comparing various 
places elsewhere.  There are multiple points of comparison, multiple trans-urban networks of 
learning, both of which are constitutive of contemporary urban governance.  This at the very 
least suggests a need to continue re-thinking territoriality vis-à-vis relationality in the New Urban 
Politics literature.   
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Figure 1: BOA and IOC voting for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 Olympic Games 
 
1992 Olympic Games 
BOA vote, London, 12 July 1985 
Birmingham 25 (votes); Manchester 5; London 2 
IOC vote, Lausanne, 17 October 1986 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3   
Barcelona (w) 29 (votes) 37 47   
Paris 19 20 23   
Brisbane 11 9 10   
Belgrade 13 11 5   
Birmingham 8 8 Eliminated   
Amsterdam 5 Eliminated -   
 
1996 Olympic Games 
BOA vote, London, 19 May 1988 
Manchester 20; Birmingham 11 
IOC vote, Tokyo, 18 September 1990 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
Atlanta (w) 19 20 26 34 51 
Athens 23 23 26 30 35 
Toronto 14 17 18 22 Eliminated 
Melbourne 12 21 16 Eliminated - 
Manchester 11 5 Eliminated - - 
Belgrade 7 Eliminated - - - 
 
2000 Olympic Games 
BOA vote, London, 24 April 1991 
Manchester 28; London 5 
IOC vote, Monte Carlo, 23 September 1993 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4  
Sydney (w) 30 30 37 45  
Beijing 32 37 40 43  
Manchester 11 13 11 Eliminated  
Berlin 9 9 Eliminated -  
Istanbul 7 Eliminated - -  
 
Note: Within the IOC vote, each IOC member has one vote.  A candidate city wins if they have 
an absolute majority of the votes.  If no city has an absolute majority, a new voting round will 
take place with the lowest scoring city from the previous round eliminated.  New rounds will 
continue until a majority winner occurs.   
(w) = winner 
